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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PAUL CHRISTENSEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs

Civil No. 15574

<

WELDON S . ABBOTT,

Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF IN ANSI-7ER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

Defendant-Respondent Abbott submits this brief in
answer to Plaintiff-Appellant Christensen's petition and brief
for rehearing.
OPENING STATEMENT

Our review of appellant's petition for rehearing and
brief in support thereof fails to show that this Court in its
majority opinion did not consider all points on the appeal;
that there are any newly discovered matters; that this Court
misconstrued or overlooked any material matters of fact; or,
that the Court based its decision on any wrong principle of
law or that it misapplied or overlooked any material matter.
On the contrary, appellant's redundant complaints go
to a proliferation of charges of "inferences," "speculations,"
and "unbelievable and unreasonable" constructions and improper
"deference" by the majority of this Court.
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Respondent's answer will respond
by

separat~

to these charges

points.
POINT I.

THE ABBOTT TO CHRISTENSEN l'lOTE HAS AN INTEGRAL PART
OF THE RANCHING BUSINESS OPERATION

Appellant complains that the Abbott-Christensen note
was never any part of the joint venture, and he would limit the
scope of "joint venture" to the Haslem ranch and the red cattle
operation, thus fragmenting the whole business and ranching
operation between the parties.
\le
Ar~0rt

submit that the note was alleged and proved by

-1r:d accepted and believed by the trial court to be one

fac.o.: of the financing arrangement in operation of the whole
joint ranching operation.

The note (Exhibit P-l) was non-

negotiable. anc'. it .·as i.;1tended to be operable only bet>-Jeen
Abbott and Christensen.

All cattle, black Angus and red Haslem.

were run together on the Haslem ranch and BU1 lands by
Christensen, with an agreement between the parties for their
sharing equally the income from the calf crop (R-50) .

Hhen the

settlement 1-.ras made on April 28, 1976, all of the cattle, black
and red, were divided equally between the parties, not just
the Haslem cattle as appellant claims, and Abbott assumed the
delinquencies on the Haslem ranch mortgage.
After a two-day trial where the details of the entire
ranching operation and finances 1-1ere fully examined, Judge
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Sorenson stated in his memorandum decision (R-40).
It would appear that, no matter what the
business arrangement was between the
parties prior to Apr~l 28, 1976, on that
date both parties concluded the business
had failed, and they therefore settled
between them a division of the property
and debts. The court finds that Exhibit 4
covers only a part of that settlement.
The court
there ~~as
therefore
(emphasis

concludes that on April 28, 1976,
an accord and satisfaction, and
finds no cause of action.
added)

The trial court's Findings of Fact (R-41) stated that
the parties were engaged in a "business enterprise"; that the
the "business venture" failed; and, that on April 28, 1976 the
parties made a division of the property and debts of their
"business operation."
In examining the business enterprise; that is, the
whole joint ranching operation, the trial court properly received and allowed proof and testimony regarding the Abbott
note as part of the business financing between the parties and
as part of the final settlement in the accord and satisfaction.
Appellant called Abbott as his witness, and at that time and
also later when Abbott testified on direct examination, no
objection going to the parole evidence rule was ever made by
Appellant to Abbott's testimony to the effect that the note
'.vas an integral part of the ~~hole business arrangement and that
it '~as to be cancelled as part of the final settlement (R-116,

117, llS, 242, 243).

Judge Sorenson stated in his memorandum
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opinion (R-40) that the assignment and assumption

instr~~ent

(Exh. P-4) was only a part of the accord and satisfaction
settlement, and in allowing testimony regarding the intended
cancellation of the note, the trial court was properin following fullfrog !Iarina. Inc. v. Lentz, 28 U.2d 261, 501P.2d 266
(1972), which case allowed parole evidence to show the whole
and complete agreement of the parties.
The trial court accepted as competent and credible
the testimony of Abbott regarding his clear understanding that
che joint business arrangement included the running of all
cattle
;Jar-

red and black, that the note '"as an integral part of
·,2

<V:1ole

·~usiness

arrangement: and that cancellation

of t~e noces was a oart of the whole accord and satisfaction
settlement.

On the apoeal, four justices of this Court, with

the full record b~fore [ne~. concurred with Judge Sorenson in
his decision and

f~ndings.

POWT II.
THE SUPRENE COURT ;[1\DE A FUll REVIEI.J OF lliE
RECORD NID THE !·1AJORirl CC:,CURRI:D HITII m:::
TRIAL COURT'S FI:~DnlGS c~E AFTER .-\ THO-DAY TRIAL
Appellant complains that the ~ajority of the Court
"infers" facts. 2akes "speculations outside of the record,"
~akes "deference to the

trial court to allow the patent in-

justice. fraud or inequitable result," and "perpetuates the
error of ~!-le trial court," all of which is "unreasonable,
unconscionable, and unthinkable anc defies all credibility."
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On appeal this Court had before it the full record,
including the transcript of the two-day trial.

The trial court

and four justices ofthis Court accepted the testimony of Abbott
as competent, credible and believable.
We submit that appellant tortures the words "infer"
and "deference."
not as a

VJeSS

The accepted judicial use of "inference" is

or surmise, but as a logical conclusion and as

used in Prudential Federal Savings v. nartford Ace. & Ind. Co.
7

U2d 366, 325 P2d 899 (1958), which states:
Inasmuch as the trial court found in favor
of the plaintiffs, they are entitled to have
us review the evidence and every reasonable
inference fairly to be drawn therefrom ln the
light most favoraule to them.
(eophasis added)
Judie ial "deference" is in no >vay blind complaisance,

but can best be defined in the language of Memmott v. U.S. Fuel Co.
22 U2d 356, 453 P2d 155:
On appeal we apply the traditional rules
of review: we assume that the trial court
believed those aspects of the evidence which
may be deemed to support his finding and
judgment; and we survey the evidence in the
light favorable thereto.
POINT III.
ALL CONDUCT OF ABBOTT A.t''!D HIS TESTil10NY WAS
REVIEWED BY THE SUPREME COURT
Appellant complains (1) that because the record shows
no demand by Abbott for the 200 black cattle awarded to him
after the settlement, therefore he was not sincere in claiming
that the note was to be cancelled as part of the settlement;
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(2) that it Abbott's testimony had been excluded by the trial
court, then the note could not be inferred to be a part of the
whole business arrangement; and,

(3)

that the reference to the

trial court's findings and decision perpetuates an "unjust,
harsh, cruel and debacling result to Christensen."
Any lack of showing in the record of subsequent demand
by Abbott for his 200 black cattle goes to the continuing controversy as to which party should pay for the care of those
cattle after the date of settlement, April 28, 1976.

The trial

court decided that the note was part of the whole business
.cT·· ·L'.'·f3ent and '"as one facet of the '"hole settlement by accord

and satisfaction on the basis of competent evidence and credible testimony.
the cattle

The question of Abbott's failure to demand

imrJedi2c~~:·

after the settlement "'as not raised in

the trial, nor on appeal, by appellant.

Consideration of such

fact should be barred now by the ruling of State v. Gandee, 537
P2d 1064 (1978), where Justice Crockett said:
The invariably accepted rule of appellate
review is that no issue will be considered
by the appellate court unless it was properly raised in the lower court in order
to give the parties and the court notice
and fair opportunity to meet, consider and
pass upon that issue.
The question of care for the cattle after date of
settlement was remanded by this Court and will be further
litigated.

Abbott in no way acquiesed in Christensen's keeping

the 200 black cattle awarded to Abbott.

The record shows that
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Christensen proceeded by Order to Show Cause (R-16) to enforce
an agistor's lien, asking sale of the black cattle and their
calves

The parties thereafter stipulated that those cattle

should be sold under the direction of Abbott, with the sale
proceeds to be deposited in a joint bank account and to be released only on order of the Court (R-35).

The sale was made

and the proceeds of sale were deposited in such joint bank
account.

The judgment of the trial Court (R-43) awarded the

proceeds of the bank account to Abbott.
Appellant speculates as to what the result would
have been if Abbott's testimony regarding the note had been
excluded.

The fact is that the trial court properly allowed

that testimony following the Bullfrog Marina, Inc.

case, supra.

Appellant complains of the net dollar effect of the
judgment on Christensen, claiming "shocking unfairness and gross
disparity," with a result that "is unjust, unreasonable, unconscionable and defies all credibility."
The record shows a two-day trial, with Judge

~orenson

and on appeal with four justices of this Court accepting the
testimony of Abbott as competent, substantial and credible to
show that the note was a vital part of the whole business
arrangement; that the note was intended to be cancelled; that
the assignment and assumption instrument was only a part of
the settlement; and that there was a valid accord and satisfaction agreement between the parties, with good consideration for
that settlement.
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POINT IV.
TilE TRIAL COURT HAD BEFORE IT COHPETENT, CREDIBLE
PROOF OF SATISFACTION OF THE ABBOTT NOTE
Appellant complains that "reasonable men would surely
conclude" that Christensen ~vould not have assented to cancelling
the Abbott note as part of the accord and satisfaction in settle·
ment of the ranching operation, and he cites Tates, Inc. v.
Little America Refining Co., 535 P2d 1228 (1975). Respondent
cited the Tates case (Res. Br. 9,10) to show that the party
asserting the accord and satisfaction has the burden of proof
ro show an asreement in settlement.

The two-day trial 1vas entirely devoted to proofs by
respondent and rebuttal by appellant of respondent's allegation of accor:i ar,..'. satisfaction.

The trial court's finding,

after hearing all o:>: the evidence, vras that there was an accord
and satisfaction agreement betvreen the parties (R-40) , thus
concluding that respondent had met his burden of proof.

If

there were any variances in the evidence. the trial court
weighed all of that evidence and the credibility of the witnesses in finding for respondent.

On the appeal, with the full

record before them, the majority of this Court concurred vrith
the trial court's assessment of all of the evidence.
Court did not have to "defer" to the trial court.

This

This Court

reviewed the testimony of the parties and four justices agreed
with the trial judge in acceoting Abbott's testimony as credible, competent and believable.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant's petition and brief for rehearing show
nothing new, overlooked or misconstrued in fact or law.

The

full record and the transcript of the two day trial were
reviewed by this Court in determining that the trial court
was correct in its findings of fact and its application of
the lavJ.
Appellant's petition for rehearing should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Wa lace

I

. Hur

/

Respondent
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